tough argumcnts), rcquiring a "long and remote train of argument" hy "a man of wide experiencc and natural ability" ibr its unsoundness to be exposed .
Unfortunately, the Parmeni es does not contain such a reply, even though the text at 133b seems to hint that Plato had already formulated one. Did he ever entertain and record a reply, and if so, could that reply rescue some version of the theory of Forms from the devastating consequences of the 'worst difficulty'? In the following, I present my previous reconstruction of that argument and the most plausible lines of response open to a defender of a theory of Forms. In the second section I argue that Plato gives clear recognition to one of those replies in the Sophist, and I show how that reply would save the theory of Forms. Finally, I will contend that this reply is Plato's best line of response, and I will discuss the problem of actually attributing the adoption of this solution to him.
I
In brief, my reconstruction of the 'worst difficulty' is this: A. Take the following general principles to be constitutive of the theory of Forms and its treatment of relational properties: 4 PHl. There are three distinct ontological items: (a) Forms, (b) forms-in-particulars (hereafter, 'immanent characters'), and (c) sensible particulars. Equality and Other Symmetrical Relations," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 3 (1984) : 292-302. 5 PHl is derived from Parm. 133a9, 133c2-5, and 134b3-4. PHl, together with PH2, represents the tenet of radical Separation (χωρίς) between the Forms on the one hand, and immanent characters and particular subjects on the other, which is generally recognized s a major principle of the argument. On this principle ( s the text suggests) what particular subjects possess by participation Plato's Rcply to the 'Worst Difficulty' Argument: Sophist 248a-249d 235 PH2. Sensible particulars have the properties (immanent characters) they have by participation in Forms.
PH3. All Forms are monadic; i. e., each Form is instantiated only by one particular in each fact it is involved in: no Form is ever instantiated by pairs or other w-tuples, whether ordered or not.
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PH4. Some facts consist of a particular participating in a Form: they are singlepronged. Other facts are multiple-pronged: they consist of an array of Forms each instantiated by one particular, where these instantiations do not by themselves constitute facts.
PH5. Forms that can enter into multiple-pronged facts cannot enter into singlepronged facts. This is the law offactual enchainment. Forms governed by this law constitute Form-chains or relations. in Forms are 'likenesses' (ομοιώματα; 133c9 -d2) of the Forms and never the Forms themselves cf. Farm, 130b) . This is so, because the Forms are "by themselves" (καθ' αυτό). Such immanent characters are the individual manifestations of Forms we find 'in' subjects; e. g., the blue of my coat or the tallness in Simmias; for the latter, see Ph. 102a -103a. According to R. E. Allen, Plato's Parmenides (Minneapolis, 1983) . pp. 168 -177, the Separation postulated at 133c2 -5 is tantamount to a denial of the participation relation -the coherence of which has been thrown into doubt by the preceding arguments (e. g., the 'Third Man') -which then becomes the driving principle of the argument. But I find this uncharitable and uncompelling. It is uncharitable because the 'Separation' asserted at 133c2 -5 is consistent with a tripartitist understanding of participation wherein χ participates in φ if and only if χ possesses a character F which is a likeness of φ (where χ never possesses φ). It is uncompelling because the argument need not be s elaborate s Plato makes it if it were in fact employing a premise which denies participation. and because we do not find the sort of argument we should then expect; namely. an argument that since the relation of participation between Forms and particulars fails, that then no relation between them is possible. But we do not find this sort of argument. Rather, we find a common sense appeal to the fact that earthl\ masters cannot master the Slave-itself (or any other Form), an appeal which occurs s a clari cation of a general principle (my PA9 following) about asymmctrical relations ofthat particular sort (Farm. 133d7 -134a1) (and this parlicular case is not produced s an example of how participation fails). 6 I argue elsewhere, op. dt. (1984) , that this principle (and thus, thosc following) must be modified such that for symmetrical relations (e. g., 'a and b are equals") and numerical classifications (e. g., 'the apostles are twclve*) morc than one particular will participate in one Form (c. g., 'a and b both participalc in the one Form Equal-itself and 'the twclve apostles participate in Twclvc-itselD 7 These particular formulations PH1 through PH5 are takcn from raslaiicifa (1972) (F-in-x, Gin-y) which are members of an immanent character chain (F -G) are, together 9 This principle is derived from Parm. 133c8 -9, which asserts that there is a certain class of Forms which "are what they are in respect to one another" and which "have their being in such references among themselves," (cf. 133e -134a, 134d4 -7). It is exemplified by the Statement that "Mastery is what it is [Mastery] of Slavery and Slavery is Slavery of Mastery," (133e3-4) (My additions to Castaneda's principles begin here, and end with PA9). 10 This principle is derived from Parm. 133e4-134al, which Claims that the relational things 'in us', like the relational Forms, "are what they are with reference toward one another." It is also derivable from Casteneda's PH1 -5. This principle should make it clear that participation is not a genuine multiple-pronged fact (and thus is not subject to PA 9 following). This is so because participation is not a relation of particulars to Forms mediated by an immanent character chain. On my account, the participation of some subject χ in some Form φ amounts to x's possession of a character F-in-x, which bears a relation of resemblance to φ. This, then, is not a dyadic fact covered by PA9 below, because neither of the relata are particulars, nor can they possess immanent characters. When the Fin-x bears the relation of resemblance to φ, it does so without its possessing another character of its own to constitute that relation (otherwise, a 'downward' sort of 4 third man' argument would result). 11 This principle is again derived from Parm. 133e4-134al; cf. n. 10 above. 12 This seems true by defmition, since Plato's usual formula for immanent characters is '(property term) εν ήμΐν' (i. e., in us particulars), and also in virtue of the notion of the Separation of Forms from particulars (PH1). Additionally, note Tan. 52a2 -3: Forms do not receive anything into themselves. Further considerations in favor of a Platonic commitment to B follow in the main text.
vvith F -G and φ -ψ, constituents of a two-pronged fact. Such sensible particulars [x, y] arc related to each other via an immanent character chain s follows: (1) χ bears F-in-x toward G-in-y, y bears G-in-y toward F-in-x; (2) χ cannot bear F-in-x toward ψ or any other Form, y cannot bear G-in-y toward φ or any olher Form. There are no chains χ-ψ, F-in-x-ψ, φ-y, or φ-G-in-y. This is the law offactual Separation.™ Besides its derivation from A and B, PA9 is also amply substantiated and exemplified by general experience. Parmenides appeals to this by noting that, for example, if some sensible particular has the asymmetrical correlative property of being a master, then that particular is only a master of some other sensible particular slave, not the Form Slaveryitself (or any other Form) (Parm. 133d7 -e3). 14 D. Consider, then, any person χ who is a knower. X, "being a man" (133e2), is a sensible particular possessing the asymmetrical correlative property of being a knower, and thus qua particular must possess the immanent character knowledge-in-x (and some kind of it; e. g., geometrical knowledge-in-x; 134a9 -bl) and not Knowledge-itself or any other Form (by PH l and PH2; . 15 This immanent character is possessed only with respect to the character known-in-y (and some kind of it; e. g., known figure-in-y; 134a9 -bl) 1A 13 This principle is an Interpretation of Parm. 133dl -e2, which Claims that things in us which bear the same names s the Forms are related among themselves. and not to Forms (133dl -4); which is said to mean that, for instance, a particular master cannot master Slavery-itself, nor can Mastery-itself be in reference to a particular slave (133d7-e2). Cf. Ph. 102alO-d3. 14 Mueller, op. cit., p. 5, will locate one defect in the 'worst diflficulty' here in PA9.
He will object that PA9, "looks to be an overhasty generalization from the relations of mastery and slavery ... Since the point about mastery does not generalize to every relation, there is no reason to think it generalizes to knowledge." But in reply, I maintain that PA9 is not arrived at inductively. Rather, the point about mastery serves s an illustrative example of PA9, a principle which derives from a general theory of relations (A). Hence, restricting PA9 to covcr mastery but exclude knowledge requires some sort of argument, givcn PA9\ common-sense generality and the many similarities between being a master and being a knower. 15 (hy PA7) possesscd by somc subject y, and since Forms cannot possess immanent characters (by B), y cannot be any Form and so must be a sensible particular object of knowledge (äs demanded by PA9; I34bl l -c3). Human knowledge, a relation wherein one relatum (the knower) is a particular, can thus only be of other particulars, never Perms. 17 On this argument, the theory of Forms äs an account employing unchanging objects of knowledge is a failure.
In response to this argument there are several rejoinders one might initially think would be open to Plato which would save the bulk of his theory. 18 The more plausible of these are: (1) eliminate immanent characters from the ontology of the theory of Forms, 19 (2) contend that PA9 is somehow illegitimately applied to the case of knowledge, and/or (3) deny (B) that Forms may not possess immanent characters. 20 l will now contend that Plato recognized -and ought to choosethe last of these alternatives, and that the evidence for this recognition is to be found in the Sophist, l will also explore the equivocal evidence for and against Plato's actual adoption of Solutions (2) Plato, op. dt., , has contended that G. E. L. Owen's argument against regarding the Timaeus äs late is flawed, since the ontology of the Timaeus is such that it "makes the third man idle," (p. 124). Cf. Owen, "The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues," in R. E. Allen (ed.) Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965): 313-338. it is), then Plato did not attempt to solve the 'worst difficulty' by (1) banishing immanent characters from his theory, since immanent characters are part of the Timaeus' ontological inventory. To see the similarity of the Phaedo-Parmenides ontology with that of the Timaeus, consider the summary description of the universe found in the middle of the text (Tim. 51e6-52c6):
... we must agree that there is, first, the unchanging Form, ungenerated and indestructible, which neither receives anything eise into itself from elsewhere nor itself enters into anything eise anywhere, invisible and otherwise imperceptible; that, in fact, which thinking has for its object.
Second is that which bears the same name and is like that Form; is sensible; is brought into existence; is perpetually in motion, coming to be in a certain place and again vanishing out of it; and is to be apprehended by belief involving perception.
Third is space, which is everlasting, not admitting destruction; providing a Situation for all things that come into bcing, but itself apprehended without the senses by a sort of bastard reasoning, and hardly an object of belief.
This, indeed, is that which we must look upon s in a dream and say that anything that is must needs be in some place and occupy some room, and that what is not somewhere in earth or heaven is nothing ... whereas for an image, since not even the very principle on which it has come into being belongs to the image itself, but it is the ever moving semblance of something eise, i t is proper that it should come to be in something eise, clinging in some sort to existence on pain of being nothing at all, on the other hand that which has real being has the support of the exactly true account ...
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The first sort of members of this ontology are clearly Platonic Forms. Furthermore, these Forms cannot "enter into anything eise anywhere/* Hence, these Forms should be identified with those of the Parmenidcs and Phaedo which, according to my Interpretation, cannot themselves be possessed by or be in particular subjects (see, e. g., P arm. \ 33a9 -b4: cf. n. 5). This then raises the question of what can enter into and bc possessed by "anything eise anywhere". The answer to this is that therc are things "like" Forms ('copies' [μιμήματα] of them; 50c5). which bear the name of the Form they are like, which come to be />/ places and can be out of -vanishing from -those places, and which are "apprehended by belief involving perception." Finally, it is said prior to this passage at 50dl -5 that these qualities which come to be 'in' are "natures" (φυσιν) that "arise between" the Forms and the subjcct which their likenesses are in (the Receptacle; υποδοχή). Herc it is further pointed out that these qualities 'cling' to their existence "on pain of being nothing" by being in something eise. These qualities would thus seem to be identifiable with immanent characters s they are found in the Phaedo and the 'worst difficulty' argument of the Pannenides.
Immanent characters, like the μιμήματα, are characterized s being likenesses of Forms (Parm. 133c9-d2; cf. Parm. 134c6 -8; Ph. 74a-75b). They are named after the Forms, are said to be *in' subjects, and can cease to be in, hence Out of, subjects (Ph. 102d5-103a2; Parm. 134a9-b4). Immanent characters are also often sensible manifestations of Forms, and thus, are what is apprehended through the employment of perception. Their existence is dependent upon two things: the Form of which they are a likeness and the subject they are found in, for if Socrates perished so would the largeness in Socrates, s well s all his other immanent characters. This is a claim parallel to the one above that the qualities "arise between" the Forms and that which the qualities are in, such that the qualities can vanish; that is, cease to exist. These qualities, like immanent characters, depend for their existence upon being in some subject.
There is also a third element in the ontology of the Timaeus, termed 4 space' (χώρα) in the passage above, and elsewhere in the text called the 'receptacle' (υποδοχή), 'matrix' (έκμαγεΐον), 'mother' (μήτηρ) and 4 nurse' (τιθήνη) of becoming. It is characterized s follows:
(a) It must be called always the same; for it never departs at all from its own character; since it is always receiving all things and never ... takes on any character that is like any of the things that enter it (50b6-cl). (b) ... by nature it is there s a matrix for everything, changed and diversified by the things that enter it, and on their account it appears to have different qualities at different times ... (50cl -4). (c) ... that which is to receive in itself all kinds must be free from all characters ... we shall not be deceived if we call it a nature invisible and characterless, all receiving, ... the most correct account of it would be this: that part of it which has been made fiery appears at any time s fire; the part that is liquified s water; and s earth or air such parts s receive likenesses of these (50e4 -51b6).
is everlasting, not admitting destruction; providing a Situation for all things that come into being ... apprehended without the senses (52a8 -b2).
Considering (a) through (d), it is fairly clear that the Receptacle can be regarded s satisfying several of the important criteria for what it is to be a 'bare particular' (that which possesses immanent characters) in the ontology of the Phaedo and Parmenides (on the hypothesis that such entities are so present; see Ph. 103all -c2 for evidence that Plato distinguished subjects s distinct ontological entities from both Forms and immanent characters). The Receptacle is, like a bare particular, something which has particularizations of Forms c in' it (a, c), but which is itself not a particularization of some Form, since it is itself unchanging (a, d). Since neither the Receptacle nor a bare particular are particularizations of some Form, they are essentially characterless (i. e., since they may exist without possessing any specific immanent character [for which there is a Form], they possess no immanent characters essentially) (c), and so cannot be apprehended by the senses (d). Since both provide a site for change to occur by the appearance and disappearance of immanent characters, both are, in and of themselves, changeless (a, b, d) . Finally, just s immanent characters in the Phaedo require there to be at least one subject for them to exist (being things which must be in something to exist), so the Receptacle provides a subject for immanent characters to exist 4 in' (although we should note that the Timaeus has apparently done away with the plural sensible particular possessors of the Phaedo [item (c) in PH1]). Given all this, the warrant is very strong for claiming that the Timaeus advocates an ontology of immanent characters. 23 Hence, it is plausible to suppose that Plato did not envision a solution (1) to the 'worst difficulty' which involved the elimination of immanent characters from his ontological inventory.
In addition to the above -and independent of the Timaeus -this response (1) would not seem the solution of preference for the reason that a 'worst diflficulty* argument can be manufactured to address a bipartite theory of Forms s well, using a modified Version of PA9:
PA9' A sensible particular may not bear an asymmetrical correlative relation (such s mastery) toward either the Form correlative to the Form which is the αιτία of its relational property (e. g., Slavery-itself), or any other Form. Like PA9, this principle is exemplified by our general experience: we can neither father nor master any Form. Since, then, a knower (like a master) is in an asymmetrical relation to some object, by PA9' that object cannot be any Form.
Next, it is going to be difficult for Plato to escape the generality of the law of factual Separation (PA9) by (2) himscir in qucstion-begging. For instance, a popul r reply to the 4 worst iliHlculty' is the claim that the doctrine of άνάμνησις saves Plato from ΡΛ*), since on that account of knowledge it is not sensible particulars lhat know Forms, but souls. 24 However, Plato's arguments for and explunations of άνάμνησις presuppose that we do in fact know Forms, which is preeisely what is at issue here. Furthermore, souls are particulars (of a sort) and would seem to possess characteristics (e. g., justice; Sapti. 246e -247b), and so may be governed by PA9 and our other principles, since those principles in fact only distinguish particular possessors of immanent characters (subjects of any sort, 'sensible' or not) from Forms and immanent characters. 25 As far s can be determined, Plato never gave up thinking of knowledge s relational, and hence, of knowers s having a relational property. 26 Thus, knowers and their knowledge would seem to be subject to the generality of PA9. Nonetheless, it is one thing to produce these conceptual objections and quite another to establish that Plato did not or would not choose to escape PA9 by claiming knowledge to be an exceptional sui generis relation. I shall return to this route of escape later in the essay.
Premise B of the 4 worst difficulty' prevents us from being in the relation of knowledge to Forms. If Forms could possess some immanent characters -by (3) denying f ll generality to B -then we could be in some asymmetrical relations to Forms, where they would then possess one element of an immanent character chain constitutive of some particular relation; e. g., the relation of knower to known thing. But there are severai obstacles to our qualifying B. , op. dt., p. 258. 25 According to Ph. 105b5 -106e7, soul is to life s fire is to heat. Thus, since heat may be treated s an immanent character which is in any fire (conceived of s a stuff) (Ph. 104b6-c4), so life is a character in any soul. For other responses to other objections -including the argument that since PA9 is compatible with the relation of participation on my account it is also compatible with our having knowledge of the Forms (W. Prior's objection) -see "Plato's Parmenides Theory," pp. 163-4, esp. n. 17, and n. 10 above. 26 A t Sophist 248dlO -e4 knowledge is at least hypothesizedto be relational. Furthermore, the conception of knowledge s an intercourse between the soul and real objects of knowledge is maintained in dialogues plausibly thought to be later than the Parmenides; see, e. g., 77m. 51d, 52a.
'possesscs' the character beauty without being in a participation rclation). But up through thc Parmenuies it is only particulars which are said lo participate in Forms. Sccond, (ii) for a subject χ to possess an immanent character manifestation F-in-x of thc Form φ is for χ to be said to rcsemble φ imperfcctly; but the Forms are not imperfcct and so would seem incapablc of posscssing immanent characters.
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The last and most persuasive consideration is this: (iii) immanent characters are constitutive of the changes particulars go through by appearing in or disappearing from ('advancing' or 'retreating'; Ph. 102d6 -103a2) subjects. For example, 'the pot became hol' is to be ontologically analyzed s 'the cold-in-the-pot left (and so ceased to exist) and the hot-in-the-pot came to be in the pot\ Thus, if Forms could possess immanent characters, those characters might also come to appear in them or leave, thereby making it false that the Forms are completely changeless.
28 Although it could be replied that some of those characters could be permanently in Forms such that they never appeared in or left Forms, the entire motivation for allowing Forms to possess immanent characters in the first place would be to make knowledge of Forms possible; but in the case of knowledge, characters 27 I derive this general principle from a consideration of Farm. 134c6 -8, which suggests that the immanent characters of the 'worst difficulty* (e. g., beauty) imperfectly resemble their Forms. This would seem to be the ontological explanation for why particulars (which possess characters) are said to be likencsses of Forms (Parm. 123d) which nonetheless 'fall short' of perfect resemblance to their Forms (Ph. 74d4-75b8). Another objection might bc that since immanent characters seem to bc nothing but the sensible exemplifications of Forms, Forms cannot possess thcm, sincc that would make them sensible. But clearly some immanent characters are not strictly sensible characteristics; e. g., the justice in Socrates' soul (Soph. 246e -247b) is not sensible.
Notice that the second half of the Vorst difficully* at Parm. 134c6-11 contains evidence for the view that Forms are in some scnsc perfect immanent characters. If this is so, then it may be argued that (prior to thc Sophist) just s the immanent characters of this world may not themsclvcs possess immanent characters (see n. 10), so perfect immanent characters (i. c., Forms) also do not possess immanent characters. 28 And this is what they are in thc middlc dialogucs. Bcginning al Ph. 78d. ϊοι instance, the Forms are contrasted with sensible things by thc attribution to thcm of those propcrties which make them suitablc objccts of knowledge. any Form, inier alia, is going to have to be just by itsclf (αυτό καθ' αυτό; PH l \Parni \ 33a9|). etcrnal (dr.i v; αδύνατον), always thc samc in rclation to thc samc things ((/*mn »rc*. du /;//;/ κατά ταιπά), and never αώηΐΐΐίηκ of any change (αλλοήοπι^; μη<φ*λη) This doctrinc is also found in thc Symposium (210c2 -211h5), ihc Kcpuh/n (479a1-3, e7-8; 484b4; cf. 38<)e-381d), thc Tmiacus (27d6 -2Χ;ι4, *Χ;ι t. 51e7-52a4), and the rhilehm (57c6-59d9, 6lcl 3).
would appcar and disappcar in Forms. On thc Parmenides theory of rclations, after all, if (per inipossibile) a Form φ passed from being unknown by some particular knower, say Socrates, to being known by Socratcs a t time t,, φ would have to come to possess an immanent character it lacked prior to ti: φ would pass from lacking 'known (προς Socrates)" prior to tj to possessing *known (προς Socrates)' at \.\. It would then be false that the Forms are completely changeless. Despite this and other obstacles (i and ii above), Plato ought to have replied to the k worst difficulty' by adopting this course (3), since it appears to be the most plausible and textually compatible alternative left. The record that Plato himself at least recognized -and possibly adopted -this response is contained in the text of Sophist 248a -249d.
The argument at Sophist 248a -249d addresses the doctrine of 4 the friends of the Forms', a doctrine which may be reasonably identified s the theory of Forms found in the middle dialogues and attacked in the first pari of the Pannenides. For instance, the Eleatic Stranger attributes to the friends of the Forms the belief that being and becoming are separate (χωρίς; 248a7) and that whereas we have intercourse with becoming by means of the senses, we have intercourse with the "nature of being" (όντως ούσίαν) through the mind by reflection. This is so because becoming is variable, whereas being "always remains constant in itself " (αεί κατά ταύτα ωσαύτως εχειν; 248al2). These beliefs are the hallmarks of the early theory of Forms, including the version attacked by the 'worst difficulty' argument.
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The strategy of the argument of the Sophist is to force a paradox on the theory of Forms, one solution to which would be the denial of the tenet that being (viz., any Form) is completely changeless: (1) the friends of the Forms maintain that the Forms are [completely] changeless (248al2, 248e5 -6), but (2) they also insist that minds and Forms "have intercourse through reflection" (κοινωνεϊν ... δια λογισμού; 248alO -11), and (3) this intercourse of knower with known involves acting upon something (το γιγνώσκειν ... εσται ποιεΐν τι; 248dlO-el) which therefore means that (4) being known is "being acted upon" (πάσχειν; 248dlO-e2). 30 (6) we do have such knowledge (of Forms) (248e8-249bl). Now either (7) no change is real, or (8) some changes are real and others not (i. e., some changes of Forms are possible), or (9) all change is real (i.e., any change is possible, even for Forms; implicit in 249b2 -249d5).
32 But (10) we must deny that (7) no change is real because (by 5, and contrary to 6) that would make knowledge impossible (249b5 -6). We must also deny that (9) all change is real, because Forms must be unchanging in some respects, at least, in order for them to serve äs the objects of our knowledge (äs in 6) (249b8 -c9). Therefore, (8) some changes are real and others not (249clO -d5), and this means (contra 1) that Forms may be said to validly inferred without it," (p. 2). W. D. ROSS, op. dt., pp. 105 -111, has argued that Plato's solution to the paradox is the denial of this premise. But bis arguments are hardly conclusive, and in any case, it would be hard to make the denial of (3) compatible with Plato's conception of knowledge äs an intercourse between souls and objects of knowledge. See n. 26 and Keyt's response to . 31 H. F. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of P lato and the Academy I (Baltimore, 1944).
p. 439, n. 376, argued that Plato resolved the paradox by rejecting one of the two principles implicit here (he does not distinguish them) that "if to know is to act on something, then that which is known is acted upon," and "to be acted upon is to be changed," (Keyt, op. cit., p. 2) . But äs Keyt argues (p. 7), the first principlc is an instance of an obvious logical principle, and so Cherniss is best understood to be making the Claim that Plato rejects the second principle. Unfortunately. there is little -if any -evidence that Plato chose or would have chosen this Option. Moreover, such a solution to the paradox is in prima fade conflict with the principle of Thcaetetus 155bl -2 that, "... it is impossible without becoming and the process of becoming for a thing to be later what it was not earlier," (scc Keyt, pp. 7-9). 32 Premise (7) derives from the possibility raised at 249b5 -6, and (9) from thc possibility presented at 249b8 -10. (8) is G. E. L. Owen's Interpretation of 249d3-4, "reality is all things that are unchanged and changed," "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," The Monist 3 (1966), p. 339, n. 16; cf. Keyt's objections to this sort of reading, pp. 5 -6. Considcrations of spacc prevcnl » me from pursuing Keyt's objections, but I may note here that Ihis Interpretation will not, äs Keyt supposes, preclude the existcnce of "anything that is completely at rest such äs a Form that no one apprchends," (Keyt, p. 6), sincc. givcn the gods of Parmenides 134c -c, all Forms are always known. Moreover, givcn thc overall structure of thc argumcnt, we may rcasonably cxpcci thc sorl of compromise position reprcscntcd by (8) to bc mentioncd äs a live possibility.
gain and lose suinc properties, and arc thus -in somc sense -not cotnplclcly changelcss.-" ΙΓ Pluto werc to acccpt (8) s l read it, he would not in any way liave to abandon the ontological distinction of Forms from particular subjeets and immanent characters. Although Forms would then no longer be completely what they are independent of everything eise (completely χωρίς), unlike particulars and immanent characters they would continue to be unchangingly what they are by themselves (still καθ' αυτό) with respect to their formal and proper attributes. 34 All the urgument requires is that Forms be capable of the sort of change involved in gaining and losing the property (-ies) of being 'known (by \Y (where V names some knower), and this would be change of an accidental sort, not one of nature (one concerning either formal or proper attributes). 35 The acceptance of this requirement -unlike other vx This Interpretation -where the paradox is taken s an argument whose conclusion is the rejection of the principle that the Forms are completely changelesshas been maintained by J. No one, apparently, has attempted to Interpret this paradox in such a way s to argue that its resolution is accomplished by denying (2) that the Forms are known. This, of course, would be compatible with the (implausible) view that Plato took the 'worst difficulty' argument so seriously that he gave up thinking of the Forms s objects of our knowledge, or gave them up entirely. 34 The 'formal attributes' of Forms are those properties that belong to them qua Forms; e. g., the properties of rest and intelligibility. Their 'proper attributes' are those properties "whose absence from a thing entails that the thing is not an instance of the given Form," (Keyt, op. cit., p. 13); e. g., heat is a proper attribute of the Form fire (see Keyt, and Sayre, op. cit., . There is no argument to be found in Plato which would support the strong thesis that the Forms must be completely changeless in order to serve s objects of knowledge. Cratylus 439c6 -440cl, for instance, does not demand this. For a lucid discussion of this point, see Keyt, pp. 9 -11. Of course, later in the Sophist it looks s though the formal attributes of Forms are not had by Forms independently -i. e., without being in relation to something -but by participation in other Forms. Furthermore, bare particulars may be said to be what they are independently of any thing eise. Nevertheless, Forms remain distinct from particulars and immanent characters by having intrinsic proper attributes (and, additionally, are distinct from immanent characters by being eternal, and are distinct from particulars by being objects of knowledge [among other things]). 35 The evidence that Plato has the conceptual sophistication to recognize and make this distinction can (arguably) be found at Ph. 102b -d and 103c-105c. Plato possible Solutions 36 -conserves all the important aspects of the theory of Forms, and so is then the response Plato ought to have adopted.
The rebuttal the adoption of (8) provides to the 'worst difficulty' is this. It allows us to claim that assumption B (that Forms cannot possess immanent characters, since that would render the Forms changeable) is false. Although it remains generally true that Forms may not possess immanent characters (and, thus, that I cannot be a master of Slaveryitself), any Form may possess any possible set of immanent characters of the form 'known (by x)', where fc x' names some particular knower. Hence, the law of factual Separation (PA9) is overly general; because of B's qualification, it may then make a justifiable exception to the relation of knowledge.
37 For instance, if Socrates comes to kno\v, and so knows what it is, for anything to be a circle (knows the Circleitself), that is a relation consisting of Socrates possessing the character knowledge-of-Circle in him, a character which is (by PA7) possessed with respect to (προς) the character known (by Socrates) which the Form Circle-itself now possesses.
As we saw above, the primary justification for B in the fc worst difficulty', and primary objection to its qualification (iii), was that the there seems to see the difference between accidental predications (e. g., 'Simmias is taller than Socrates') and those 'true by nature' (e. g., Tive is an odd number*).
It should be mentioned here that the Form the Known -being a Formmust be said to remain the Known even if known by no one. However, it is plausible to suppose that the sense in which the Known is what it is (the Known). is different from the sense in which it has the property of being known by me: its proper attribute of'knownness' is not relationally dependent upon any sensible particular knower. After all, the Child is what it is though fathered by no one. In any case, the Known never ceases to be known by someone (e. g., a god; P arm. 134c -e).
I should also point out that 'the Known' is a commentator's coinage for "that very thing which is truth (real);" Parm. 134a3 -4. This coinage is justified by PA6 [given that Parm. 134a -b mentions a Form Knowledge-itselfj and by analogy with the Mastery-Slavery example of 133d -e; see "Plato's Parnwnides Theory," p. 158, n. 15. Note that the existence of this Form counts against solution (2) of taking knowledge to be a sui gcneris relation. 36 See nn. 30, 31, 33. 37 The fact that -given an emended B -I may still not master Slavcry-itsclf (etc.) derives from more fundamental principles concerning the nature of Forms and particulars: Forms are not the kind of things that can clcan my officc or that can be purchased, and a person is not the kind of thing that could ordei them about. So dcspite its similarity to mastery-slavery, thcrc is noihing ahout knowledge-known and the nature of Forms (given an emended B) and particulars which would forbid a Form from coming to possess known-in-it (so l ha l il would be known by somcone The Sophist, fmally, also shows us how Plato could respond to the other two obstacles (i, ii) raised earlier against the possibility of qualifying premise B. First, (i) although up through the Parmenides it is true that immanent characters are only possessed by subjects in virtue of their participation in a Form, Plato does not give this principle up by allowing Forms to possess immanent characters of the form 'known (by x)\ A major accomplishment of the Sophist is its introduction of the concept of Forms combining with one another, that is, participating in one another. Thus, the Sophist contains the conceptual sophistication to account for some Form coming to possess a character of the form 'known (by x)' in it; namely, Plato may claim that if some Form φ is known by x, and so possesses known (by x) in it (where 'x' names a particular knower of φ), then φ participates in the Form the Known (the Form correlative to the Form Knowledge-itself)· Second, (ii) although it remains true that for some sensible particular to possess an immanent character F is for that particular to be said to imperfectly resemble a Form φ, it need not follow that Forms are no longer perfect in any important sense by possessing immanent characters. To serve their primary role s the objects of knowledge, Forms only need to be perfectly -that is, unquali edly and unchangingly 38 An additional reason for supposing that he did adopt this solution is the previously mentioned principle (n. 31) of Theaetetus 155bl -2. However, s Keyt notes (op. dt., pp. 8 -9) , although this principle is entertained by Plato at this point in the dialogue, he does not clearly assert it. Another piece of evidence suggesting a connection of the 'worst difficulty' to Sophist 248a -249d is their similar use of the term δύναμις. In the Sophist the Stranger may be taken to argue that both contenders in the 'battle of the giants' accept δύναμις s a mark of being (247d8 -e4). The 'friends of the Forms* would be forced to accept it if they acknowledge either that the Forms are acted on in being known (248d -e) or that Forms have the capacity (δύναμιν; 251e8, 252d2, passim) to combine with each other. Likewise, in the Parmenides Forms (and immanent characters s well) have δύναμις, and have it in respect of each other (Parm. 133e4-134al). Cf. Sayre, op. dt., PlatcTs Reply to the ^Worst Difficulty' Argument: Sophist 248a-249d 249 -what they are in respect of their formal and proper attributes. 39 Whether or not Forms possess one or more immanent characters of the form 'known (by x)' does not affect their perfection in that requisite sense.
At this point it is very tempting to conclude that not only ought Plato to have adopted this response, but that he did adopt it, and that here in the Sophist we see him acknowledge (8) and the consequent rejection of bis theory's tenet that Forms are completely changeless. Unfortunately, and äs David Keyt has convincingly argued, there are no clear textual indications anywhere in the Platonic corpus of an explicit Platonic commitment to the proposition that Forms change in any respect, and a few citations which support the view that he never did accept such a claim. 40 My reading of Sophist 249d3 -4 äs (8) above, for instance, is not forced by the text, which can be interpreted äs a claim that being is "äs many things äs are unchanged and äs many äs are changed." The things that are unchanged are the objects of knowledge, the Forms; the things that are changed are things that are ensouled, living bodies. 41 Additionally, the view that Forms imdergo any changes at all -even accidental ones -would appear to be in conflict with the claim of the Timaeus that the Forms are timeless entities (37el -38a8) which are always in the same state (27d6 -28a4). 42 However, in reply to this, it may be pointed out that on the above alternative Interpretation of my (8) (Soph. 249d3-4), Plato is apparently ignoring the argument centered at 248c -e, whose essence is the claim that a Form's coming to be known is incompatible with its changelessness. Hence, because we may reasonably expect some sort of resolution to this argument, and because (8) provides a natural resolution, it seems the preferable reading.
My reply to the evidence of the Timaeus passages above (and others) is more tentative: it seems that Plato is capable of differentiating 'real' 39 For example, Equality-itself is not qualified -äs are particular cquals -by being equal (a proper attribute) in some respect (e. g., length, and for somc timc period); neither is its formal attribute of being at rest merely relative (o somc aspect and temporary (äs is the case with material objects). Again (see n. 35), the Form the Known is what it is (i. c., has its proper Attributes) irrespectivc of whcther it is qualified by being known by somconc 01 not, just äs the conccpt of triangularity remains essentially unaltcrcd äs somconc comes to understand it. Cf. Keyt, op. dt., pp. 11 --14. *> Keyt, ibid., pp. 5-9. 41 Ibid.. p. 6. « Ibid.. p. 9. See also 77m. 38a3, 54a1 -4; Phil. 57c6 -5«M9, 61c1 V clumgc in time -which depends upon real altcrations in individuals (i. e., those which are logically possible for individuals independent of vvhatcver relaüons they bear to other things) -from mercly relational "Cambridge" changes which are parasitic upon such real changes (see T/i. 154e-155d for evidence that Plato is capable of seeing this).
43 If this is so, then Plato may hold that the sort of change a Form undergoes when i t is "acted upon' by coming to be known is merely a derivative Cambridge change, and so not a 'real* accidental change; such a change derives from the real alteration a knower undergoes when he comes to know a Form (e. g., just äs Socrates may become taller than Simmias [Cambridge only] without his own height changing, simply because of a real alteration in Simmias' height). Hence, Plato may consistently hold that (although) the Forms 'in their being' (i. e., in respect of the properties they have without respect to changing sensible particulars) are "timeless" and "always in the same state," they nonetheless are the bearers of Cambridge properties which come and go (but which mark no real change -not even a 'real' accidental change -in their being).
This solution would make the Forms analogous in a way to the Receptacle, which is "always the same" in respect of its own nature yet is nonetheless "changed" in a limited sense by the entering and withdrawal of immanent characters (Tim. 50b -c): the sort of change the Receptacle undergoes seems to be of the Cambridge variety, analogous to the Cambridge change a mirror undergoes when it ceases to k have' the reflection of some object in it. With this analysis, however, we encounter a clear textual obstacle to the solution I have been pressing. Timaeus 52a2 -3 quite clearly states that the sort of characters which enter and leave the Receptacle (i. e., even 'Cambridge characters') do not enter or leave Forms. Thus, here we have evidence that although Plato recognized and entertained the solution to the 'worst difficulty' of qualifying B (3), he did not adopt that solution. 44 It would appear that for the author of the Timaeus Forms simply may not come to possess immanent characters of any sort. 43 I owe this point to Richard Mohr's paper, "Plato on Time and Eternijty," presented to the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December, 1984. 44 I am grateful to R. Mohr for reminding me of this evidence. I want to point out in reply to this that the Timaeus has been thought by some (e. g., Brandwood, op. cit., xvii) to have been composed prior to the Sophist. If this dating is correct, then the evidence of the Timaeus against Plato's having actually adopted solution (3) of the Sophist becomes much less compelling.
l have contended earlier that Plato did not (and should not) adopt solution (1) of abandoning immanent characters, and that he will encounter problems should he attempt to exempt knowledge from the ränge of the law of factual Separation (PA9) (solution [2] ). But if Plato rejected the above solution (3) of qualifying B, it would then seem that Plato is left back in the troublesome position of (2) contending that knowledge is a sui generis relation. If so, then he would reject premise (3) and/or (5) of the Sophist's argument: Forms are known, but either are not acted upon in being known, or, if acted upon, are not changed in any way -not even in a 'Cambridge' way -by undergoing that 'action'. 45 This position is troublesome, again, because äs should be apparent at this point, the 'worst difficulty' is -among other things -a demand for an account of knowledge which will show it to be exempt from PA9. That Plato should not (apparently) have responded to this demand is not surprising: no epistemological theory today is much closer than was Plato to possessing an adequate account of the relation which knowledge seems to be.
46
In light of the preceding discussion, it seems that we must concede that there is no conclusive evidence in favor of attributing either of the competing responses (2) or (3) to Plato. He may well have preferred solution (2) over solution (3), or may even have been unconcerned to commit himself to a canonical resolution of the 'worst difficulty*. Nonetheless, because of the obstacles associated with the adoption of solution (2), and because there are no clear reasons for Plato to maintain the complete immutability of the Timaeus Forms, it seems to me that Plato ought to have adopted solution (3) and qualified the principle that Forms do not possess any immanent characters (and so do change in the one regard of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be known). Whether or not he did choose this course, however, the argument of Sophist 248a -249d is significant in that it is here that Plato at Icast exhibited his recognition of one important and palatable resolution of the 'worst difficulty' argument of the Parmenides.
The reading of Sophist 248a -249d I have offered and the relation of it to Parmenides 133a-135a I have presented, are rendered plausible by the consideration that my thesis supports the reconstruction of thc 'worst difficulty' äs a valid argument, thus allowing it to live up to its 45 And thus, he would reject the relevance of the principle of Theaclcius 155b1 -2 mentioned earlier (nn. 31, 38): in coming to be known, a Form would not bccomc. and so be, what it was not earlier. 46 My thanks to Julius Moravcsik for this point. dcscription in the text. Additionally, this view contributes to the portrait of a Plato who developed a sophisticated theory of relations, who then had the honcsty and insight to see and record the 'worst difficulty' that theory yields for the hard-won theory of Forms, and who then had the ability and tenacity to work out (if not actually adopt) one particularly viable and integrated solution to that difficulty. It should come äs no surprise to us -and is the overriding virtue of this thesis -that the "man of wide experience and natural ability" of the Parmenides should turn out to be Plato himself. and drawn-out' argument promised by the Parmenides (133b4-cl), it seems subtle enough to warrant that description prior to its füll recognition in the Sophist. l am very grateful to Nicholas Smith for his many helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Jeff Pelletier and an anonymous referee of this Journal for their comments on earlier versions of ihis paper, and Hector-Neri Castaneda and Charlotte Stough for their encouragement of my studies of the 'worst difflculty'. The bürden of whatever errors remain in the paper should be placed at my door alone. The immediate ancestor of this paper was presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, at the Western meeting of the American Philosophical Association, April, 1985, and has been revised in the light of the spirited discussion which followed (see esp. the points made by R. Mohr and J. Moravcsik, nn. 44 and 46).
